The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) deployed its Biometric Identity Management System (BIMS) in Afghanistan as part of the Forcibly Returned Afghans Enrollment (FARE) programme, a cash-based intervention designed to provide financial assistance to Afghan nationals forcibly returned from neighbouring countries, principally Pakistan and Iran, who lacked proper documentation. The FARE programme operated through a network of eight UNHCR encashment centres located in Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat, where returning Afghans could receive cash grants to cover immediate needs including travel costs, rent, food, and access to essential reintegration services.
The AI component of the system centres on BIMS, which is built on Accenture's Unique Identity Service Platform (UISP). BIMS is a multimodal biometric platform that captures three biometric modalities from each individual aged five or older: ten fingerprints, images of both irises, and a facial photograph. These biometric records are transmitted to and stored in a centralised biometric database located in Geneva, Switzerland, which serves as the global reference repository for UNHCR's biometric identity records across more than 90 country operations worldwide. As of 2024, BIMS had enrolled at least 13 million individuals across 96 humanitarian locations globally.
The biometric matching process at encashment centres operates through Accenture's Biometric Matching Engine, a software component of the UISP that uses AI algorithms to compare captured biometric identifiers — fingerprints, iris patterns, and facial features — against large volumes of stored reference identity data. The matching engine automatically creates a unique identification strategy to optimise the speed and effectiveness of database searches for matching records. At the point of cash distribution, a returning Afghan presents themselves at an encashment centre, where their biometric data is captured and matched against their previously enrolled BIMS record in a one-to-one (1:1) verification process. A successful biometric match confirms the individual's identity and authorises the release of the cash grant. The system also supports one-to-many (1:N) deduplication searches to prevent duplicate registrations and ensure that assistance reaches unique, intended recipients, thereby reducing the risk of fraud and incorrect disbursements.
The FARE registration drive was completed in 2022, with the cash distribution phase following subsequently. By early 2024, the programme had provided financial assistance to approximately 39,000 Afghan returnees. In the first eight months of 2024 alone, UNHCR Afghanistan assisted 44,786 Afghan returnees comprising 10,782 households through its encashment centre network. The scale of the returnee crisis intensified significantly in 2025, with an estimated 2.5 million Afghans returning or being forced to return from neighbouring countries, with encashment centres processing approximately 7,000 daily arrivals, of whom roughly 80 percent were eligible for cash assistance.
The biometric verification process at encashment centres is governed by strict standard operating procedures designed to safeguard personal data and ensure fair access to assistance. UNHCR's data protection framework for biometric processing is underpinned by three key policy instruments: the Policy on the Protection of Personal Data of Persons of Concern to UNHCR (2015), the Guidance on the Protection of Personal Data of Persons of Concern to UNHCR (2018), and the General Policy on Personal Data Protection and Privacy (2022). User access to BIMS is provided on a need-to-know basis, with multi-factor authentication where possible, and visibility over biometric records and displayed personal information is customised for each user type. Only dedicated system administrators in each operation have advanced search rights.
The programme faced a critical operational disruption on 9 September 2025, when UNHCR was compelled to halt activities at all eight encashment centres across Afghanistan. This closure was precipitated by Taliban de facto authority instructions preventing Afghan female staff from accessing their workplaces, with security forces visibly present at the entrances of UN premises in Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif to enforce the restriction. UNHCR Representative Arafat Jamal stated that continued operations were 'entirely impossible without Afghan female workers, because the experience of biometrics is a very tactile one' and because confidential protection screening interviews required female interviewers given that approximately 52 percent of returnees are women. The closure created what Jamal described as 'an enormous amount of suffering' for the affected returnee population. As of the latest available reporting, negotiations with the Taliban authorities regarding resumption of services remained ongoing.
The use of biometric systems in humanitarian cash assistance contexts carries well-documented risks. Research published in the Forced Migration Review highlights concerns around consent, privacy, data protection, and responsibility, particularly when multiple private and public actors access collected data. Technical failures in biometric recognition — such as undetected fingerprints — can result in refugees being excluded from assistance. The Afghanistan context presents heightened data protection concerns given the Taliban's previous seizure of US military biometric devices, raising questions about the security of biometric data in the event of further political instability. The system processes special category biometric data (fingerprints, iris scans, facial images) of a highly vulnerable population in a fragile and conflict-affected state where domestic data protection legislation is absent or unenforced, and where the biometric data is transferred internationally to a centralised database in Geneva.