National Identity Card (Rastriya Parichaya Patra) — Biometric ABIS for Identity Deduplication and Verification
Overview
Nepal's National Identity Card programme, known as the Rastriya Parichaya Patra, is a nationwide biometric identity initiative managed by the Department of National ID and Civil Registration (DoNIDCR) under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The programme deploys an Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) supplied by the French identity technology firm IDEMIA to perform 1:N deduplication and 1:1 verification of citizens during enrolment, with the primary purpose of preventing duplicate identities and authenticating applicants to support secure access to government services, social security allowances, and civil registration.
The programme has its origins in a 2012 government decision to replace paper-based citizenship certificates with smart biometric identity cards, with initial funding of approximately USD 14 million provided by the Asian Development Bank. IDEMIA (formerly Morpho) was selected as the system integrator following a competitive procurement process in 2016, and the first biometric identity cards were delivered in December 2018. The initial pilot phase saw approximately 117,000 national ID cards issued through 66 enrolment stations, capturing photographs, personal information, and ten fingerprints. A subsequent contract phase, valued at approximately USD 14.6 million, expanded the scope to distribute 12 million biometric ID cards nationwide and upgraded the system from an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) to a multimodal ABIS. This upgraded system captures ten fingerprints and two iris scans per enrollee, along with a facial photograph and digital signature, all stored on a chip-equipped polycarbonate smart card with multiple security features.
The ABIS performs biometric deduplication across the entire enrolled population to ensure that each citizen receives a single unique identity number. During enrolment, the system compares the applicant's biometric templates against the existing database in a 1:N search to detect and prevent duplicate registrations. For subsequent authentication events, the system performs 1:1 verification matching the individual's live biometric capture against their stored templates. The system is designed to process data from millions of citizens and has been operational since late 2018, with progressive national rollout across Nepal's 77 districts.
As of mid-2024, biometric data has been collected from over 14 million citizens, representing approximately 90 percent of the eligible population. Over 16.54 million applications have been received nationwide. However, card production and distribution have lagged significantly behind data collection: approximately 3 million biometric ID cards have been printed, 1.8 million distributed to district offices, and only around 350,000 cards delivered directly to citizens as of mid-2024. The Department assigns approximately 2,000 unique identity numbers daily during birth registrations, integrating newborn registration into the National Identity Management Information System (NIDMIS) from the outset.
The legal basis for the programme is provided by the National Identity and Civil Registration Act, 2076 (2020) and the National Identity and Civil Registration Regulations, 2077 (2021). Nepal's Constitution, under Article 51, mandates the development of an integrated national identity management information system. In January 2025, Nepal's Supreme Court dismissed writ petitions challenging the mandatory implementation of the national ID, directing the government to proceed with compulsory use for accessing passports, bank accounts, social security allowances, mobile SIM cards, and health insurance.
The programme has raised significant data protection and privacy concerns. Digital security professionals and lawmakers have questioned how sensitive personal biometric information is stored, accessed, and handled, drawing comparisons to data breaches in other large-scale biometric systems such as India's Aadhaar. Nepal's data protection framework includes Article 28 of the Constitution (right to privacy), the Individual Privacy Act (2018), and the Individual Privacy Regulation (2020), but cyberlaw experts have identified insufficient data protection in the existing legal frameworks, with significant loopholes. Parliamentary members have highlighted a lack of financial and human resources, including insufficient IT staff and skilled engineers, within the implementing agencies.
The system presents notable exclusion risks. An estimated 6.7 million people in Nepal lack citizenship certificates, which are a prerequisite for national ID enrolment, effectively excluding them from the biometric identity system. Affected groups include foreign residents, refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, persons with disabilities who face administrative discrimination in practice, minorities, elderly citizens, and low-income populations without internet access for the mandatory online pre-registration step. The government has not implemented special measures for vulnerable and isolated communities to ensure equitable access to enrolment.
Implementation challenges extend beyond exclusion risks. Local ward offices continue to require paper-based citizenship certificates for many administrative functions despite the digital mandate, creating disjointed implementation. Citizens report that the national ID card remains limited in practical utility for accessing health subsidies, land registration, and bank account opening, necessitating further legislative amendments and digital integration across government systems. Card distribution has been hampered by slow production rates and insufficient wages paid to distribution workers. Research has identified political instability, inadequate infrastructure, limited education, and constrained resource capacities as significant barriers to the programme's success.
In November 2025, the Election Commission of Nepal integrated the national ID biometric database with the voter registration system, allowing citizens with national identity cards to register as voters online without visiting election offices for separate biometric capture. This cross-system data sharing between DoNIDCR and the Election Commission resulted in over 200,000 new voter registrations in a short period, demonstrating the system's potential for interoperability across government functions, but also raising questions about purpose limitation and data minimisation in the absence of comprehensive data protection legislation.
No published data protection impact assessment (DPIA), algorithmic impact assessment, or independent technical audit of the ABIS system has been identified in publicly available documentation. No formal grievance mechanism for biometric mismatches or erroneous deduplication outcomes has been documented beyond basic administrative error correction forms. The oversight model for the biometric matching process — specifically, whether human adjudication is required for cases flagged by the ABIS as potential duplicates — has not been described in any publicly available government or vendor documentation.
Classification
AI Capabilities
Use Cases
Social Protection Functions
| SP Pillar (Primary) | Social assistance |
Programme Details
| Programme Name | National Identity Card (Rastriya Parichaya Patra) / National Identity Management Information System (NIDMIS) |
| Programme Type | Other |
| System Level | Implementation/delivery chain |
Nationwide biometric identity programme managed by the Department of National ID and Civil Registration (DoNIDCR) under the Ministry of Home Affairs, issuing smart biometric identity cards with embedded chip containing fingerprint, iris, facial, and digital signature data. The system underpins access to social security allowances, passports, banking, health insurance, and other government services.
Implementation Details
| Implementation Type | Classical ML |
| Lifecycle Stage | Integration and Deployment |
| Model Provenance | Commercial/proprietary |
| Compute Environment | Not documented |
| Sovereignty Quadrant | Not assessed |
| Data Residency | Not documented |
| Cross-Border Transfer | Not documented |
Risk & Oversight
| Decision Criticality | High |
| Human Oversight | HITL |
| Development Process | Fully third-party developed |
| Highest Risk Category | Governance and institutional oversight risks |
| Risk Assessment Status | Not assessed |
Risk Dimensions
Data-related risks
Governance and institutional oversight risks
Market, sovereignty and industry structure risks
Model-related risks
Operational and system integration risks
Impact Dimensions
Accountability, transparency and redress
Autonomy, human dignity and due process
Equality, non-discrimination, fairness and inclusion
Privacy and data security
Systemic and societal
Safeguards
Deployment & Outcomes
| Deployment Status | Operational Deployment (Limited Rollout) |
| Year Initiated | 2018 |
| Scale / Coverage | Over 14 million citizens enrolled (biometric data collected); approximately 350,000 cards distributed to citizens as of mid-2024 |
| Funding Source | Asian Development Bank (initial USD 14 million); Government of Nepal |
| Technical Partners | IDEMIA (formerly Morpho) — system integrator for end-to-end biometric enrolment, ABIS deduplication/verification, and smart card production and personalisation. Contract valued at approximately USD 14.6 million for the expanded national rollout phase. |
Outcomes / Results
Over 14 million citizens enrolled (approx. 90% of eligible population) as of mid-2024. Over 16.54 million applications received. Approximately 3 million cards printed, 1.8 million distributed to district offices, 350,000 delivered to citizens. Approximately 2,000 unique IDs assigned daily at birth. Election Commission integration in November 2025 enabled over 200,000 online voter registrations. Significant gap between biometric data collection and card distribution.
Challenges
Significant card production and distribution backlog; legislative gaps preventing full digital integration across government agencies; data protection framework identified as insufficient by cyberlaw experts; exclusion of estimated 6.7 million people lacking citizenship certificates; persons with disabilities face administrative discrimination in enrolment; inadequate infrastructure and IT staffing; local offices still require paper citizenship certificates despite digital mandate.
Sources
- SRC-003-NPL-002 IDEMIA (2018). 'IDEMIA delivers the first smart national identity card to the Government of Nepal', IDEMIA Press Release, December 2018. Available at: https://www.biometricupdate.com/201812/idemia-delivers-machine-readable-biometric-id-card-to-nepal (Accessed: 24 March 2026).
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201812/idemia-delivers-machine-readable-biometric-id-card-to-nepal - SRC-005-NPL-002 Biometric Update (2021). 'Nepal considers $14M biometric national ID card bids from Thales and Idemia', Biometric Update, June 2021. Available at: https://www.biometricupdate.com/202106/nepal-considers-14m-biometric-national-id-card-bids-from-thales-and-idemia (Accessed: 24 March 2026).
https://www.biometricupdate.com/202106/nepal-considers-14m-biometric-national-id-card-bids-from-thales-and-idemia - SRC-007-NPL-002 Biometric Update (2025). 'Nepal election commission integrates national ID biometrics', Biometric Update, November 2025. Available at: https://www.biometricupdate.com/202511/nepal-election-commission-integrates-national-id-biometrics (Accessed: 24 March 2026).
https://www.biometricupdate.com/202511/nepal-election-commission-integrates-national-id-biometrics - SRC-004-NPL-002 Burt, C. (2024). 'Nepal's digital identity transformation fosters challenges', Biometric Update, 24 June. Available at: https://www.biometricupdate.com/202406/nepals-digital-identity-transformation-fosters-challenges (Accessed: 24 March 2026).
https://www.biometricupdate.com/202406/nepals-digital-identity-transformation-fosters-challenges - SRC-001-NPL-002 Nepal Law Commission (2020). National Identity and Civil Registration Act, 2076 (2020). Kathmandu: Nepal Law Commission. Available at: https://lawcommission.gov.np/content/12265/12265-national-identity-card-and-vit/ (Accessed: 30 October 2025).
https://lawcommission.gov.np/content/12265/12265-national-identity-card-and-vit/ - SRC-002-NPL-002 Nepal Law Commission (2021). National Identity and Civil Registration Regulations, 2077 (2021). Kathmandu: Nepal Law Commission. Available at: https://lawcommission.gov.np/content/12841/12841-national-identity-card-and-vit/ (Accessed: 30 October 2025).
https://lawcommission.gov.np/content/12841/12841-national-identity-card-and-vit/ - SRC-006-NPL-002 Statelessness Encyclopedia Asia Pacific (2025). 'Nepal – Digital ID', SEAP. Available at: https://seap.nationalityforall.org/digital-id/regional-overview/south-asia/nepal/ (Accessed: 24 March 2026).
https://seap.nationalityforall.org/digital-id/regional-overview/south-asia/nepal/
How to Cite
DCI AI Hub (2026). 'National Identity Card (Rastriya Parichaya Patra) — Biometric ABIS for Identity Deduplication and Verification', AI Hub AI Tracker, case NPL-002. Digital Convergence Initiative. Available at: https://socialprotectionai.org/use-case/NPL-002